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Abstract 
Empirical research on public defense is a new and rapidly growing field in 
which the quality of attorney-client communication is emerging as a top priority. 
For decades, law has lagged behind medicine and other professions in the 
empirical study of effective communication. The few studies of attorney-client 
communication focus mainly on civil cases. They also tend to rely on role-playing 
by non-lawyers or on post hoc inquiries about past experiences. Direct observation 
by researchers of real-time defendant-defender communication offers advantages 
over those approaches, but injecting researchers into the attorney-client dyad is in 
tension with legal and ethical precepts that protect the very communication that 
is being studied. This Article discusses these problems and some responsive 
strategies. After assessing the available alternatives, the Article argues for judicial 
enforcement of an evidentiary privilege that protects and promotes empirical 
research on this high-priority topic. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Empirical research on public defense is a new and rapidly growing 
field.1 The study of effective defendant-defender communication is 
emerging as a top priority.2 There are many reasons to prioritize 
communication as a research topic. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has acknowledged that communication is a critical component of 
the right to counsel.3 Yet recent studies document intense frustration 
with the amount, timing, and quality of communication between people 
who face criminal charges and the government-paid lawyers who 
represent them.4 
Defendants who participate in these studies describe feeling unheard, 
silenced, and effectively erased from resolving their own cases.5 In the 
words of one participant, “[T]hey just come down there with a paper . . . 
and he’s tellin’ you ‘We gonna plead this.’ Wait a minute, dude, we ain’t 
even talk. ‘And if we plead this the judge already said that he would do 
this.’ When did that happen?! Where was I at?!”6 Data from another study 
indicate that abysmal experiences degrade aspirations for improvement: 
“I think that you should be like, by law, allotted a minimal amount of 
time with your attorney. Not three minutes . . . you’re allotted ten 
minutes to talk to this guy prior to your appearance in court.”7 
Defenders express similar frustration. When asked to identify their 
top-priority empirical research questions, they zeroed in on barriers to 
communication. Their questions were wide-ranging and evocative. 
Examples include: “Why don’t my clients think I’m a real lawyer?”; “How 
do you deal with hostile clients who do not like you?”; “What can I do to 
get my clients to listen to my advice?”; “How many defendants are afraid 
1. Janet Moore & Andrew L.B. Davies, Knowing Defense, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 345, 
346 & n.1 (2017). 
2. See Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped and Underappreciated:
Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 761–64 (2015); 
Moore & Davies, supra note 1, at 361–63; Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of 
Satisfaction Among Clients of a Public Defender Agency, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 431, 434 
(2017).  
3. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
366–67 (2010); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88–90 (1976). 
4. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 2.
5. Id. at 762–63.
6. Id. at 763; see also AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 
11–23 (2009). 
7. These data are emerging from a pilot study for which this Article’s lead Author is
the principal investigator. Janet Moore et al., Reducing Mass Incarceration by Improving 
Public Defense: Defining and Assessing Quality Attorney-Client Communication (Univ. of 
Cincinnati, IRB No. 2016-0313). 
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to tell our staff the truth?”; “[How can I] build trust . . . in order to 
avoid . . . surprises at trial?” and, in a mirror image of comments from 
the earlier study with defendants, “How can we ensure the client doesn’t 
feel erased from the process?”8 
However, these new studies reveal more than mutual frustration. 
They also reveal a shared awareness of the connection between 
communication, trust, case investigation, and successful advocacy.9 The 
studies reveal a hunger not only for better communication, but also for 
research on strategies to achieve it.10 
Part II of this Article discusses these and other reasons for prioritizing 
research on attorney-client communication in public defense. Part III 
describes the theory, methods, and findings of past studies and sketches 
a plan for future inquiry. Part IV tackles the complicated ethical and 
evidentiary issues implicated by such research and offers some 
responsive strategies. The alternatives are wide-ranging; for example, 
they include the use of machine-learning avatars in simulated defendant-
defender communication.11 After canvassing the alternatives, this Article 
argues for judicial enforcement of an evidentiary privilege that covers 
empirical research on public defense. Privileging public defense research 
is an optimal strategy for promoting greater understanding of a critically 
important but understudied subject. 
II. WHY STUDY ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION IN PUBLIC DEFENSE?
There are many reasons to focus empirical research on attorney-client
communication in public defense. The first involves the pivotal interests 
at stake. The right to counsel is “fundamental”12 because it is “necessary 
to insure . . . life and liberty” against the exercise of concentrated 
government power.13 Criminal prosecution and sentencing also threaten 
property and reputation; collateral consequences of conviction block 
access to jobs, housing, education, voting, jury service, and other 
opportunities for full participation in a democratic society; all of these 
impacts fall disproportionately upon poor people and people of color.14 
8. Moore & Davies, supra note 1, at 362–63.
9. See supra notes 1–2.
10. See supra notes 2, 7.
11. See, e.g., Archie Zariski, Avatars Go to Law School: Digital Standardized (and Not
So Standard) Clients for Law School Teaching (Athabasca Univ., Working Paper, 2010), 
https://auspace.athabascau.ca/handle/2149/2875 [https://perma.cc/ZTV9-XR2G]. 
12. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986).
13. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
14. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 23–26 (2014); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
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Just as the criminal defendant’s right to counsel is fundamental to the 
functioning of a healthy democracy, so too is attorney-client 
communication an essential component of the right to counsel.15 This is 
so as a matter of law because the constitutional right to counsel requires 
lawyers to act reasonably based on existing attorney performance 
standards.16 In enforcing the right to counsel, courts rely on performance 
guidelines, such as those issued by the American Bar Association, as 
evidence of what reasonable attorney performance should look like.17 
Those attorney performance standards emphasize the duty to 
communicate.18 They require lawyers to “seek to establish a relationship 
of confidence and trust” with each client, “keep the client informed” of all 
case developments, “advise the client on all aspects of the case,” and 
“consult with the client on decisions relating to control and direction of 
the case.”19 Related legal ethics and evidence rules also prioritize 
confidential communications, trust, and loyalty.20 
This interrelationship of performance standards and constitutional 
law means that pressure on one can reshape the other.21 A leading 
example of this hydraulic relationship between praxis and constitutional 
meaning involves defendant-defender communication. In Padilla v. 
Kentucky,22 the Court imposed a new constitutional requirement that 
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 91–103, 233–58, 303–13 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn 
eds., 2014) (discussing racially disparate impact of carceral systems, including creation of 
lower categories of citizenship and disenfranchisement); Michael Leo Owens, Ex-Felons’ 
Organization-Based Political Work for Carceral Reforms, 651 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 256–57 (2014); Loïc Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and 
Social Insecurity, 25 SOC. F. 197, 201–04 (2010). 
15. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
17. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366–67.
18. AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 15 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/le 
gal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L938-DCWH] (citing standards). 
19. Id. The United Nations has promulgated similar standards. See G.A. Res. 43/173,
at princ. 18 (Dec. 9, 1988); G.A. Res. 67/187, at ¶ 28 (Mar. 28, 2013). 
20. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006)
(describing the importance of attorney loyalty to the client); Monroe H. Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 
64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966); Jancy Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel 
of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525, 527–28, 541–43 (2007) (discussing importance of 
defendant-defender trust).  
21. Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1707
(2016). 
22. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
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counsel inform clients, before a plea is entered, about the deportation 
consequences of a conviction.23 The Court’s decision in Padilla led many 
defenders to find and use previously untapped information about 
immigration law in order to provide constitutionally compliant advice to 
the people they represented.24 
Unfortunately, the lack of communication addressed in Padilla is all 
too common. In fact, communication problems have been cited as the 
most frequent basis of formal bar complaints against lawyers generally.25 
Indeed, early empirical research on attorney-client communication was 
motivated in part by survey data documenting perceptions of lawyers as 
“inattentive, unresponsive, insensitive, non-empathetic, uncooperative, 
and arrogant.”26 
These problems are even more intense in the public defense context, 
where a unique set of obstacles hinders communication.27 The obstacles 
are reflected in the “Public Pretender” stereotype.28 The stereotype has 
complex origins. As indicated by the study data offered in Part I, it is 
actualized in grim expectations and experiences of public defense 
representation on the part of defendants and defenders alike. 
The origins of the Public Pretender stereotype lie in the sometimes 
complementary but often conflicting constitutional and cultural impulses 
that have shaped the right to government-paid counsel.29 On one hand, 
that right is an idiosyncratic constitutional mandate to redistribute 
23. Id. at 374–75.
24. Joel L. Schumm, Conference Report: Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function,
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 4–6 (2011). 
25. Stephen E. Schemenauer, What We’ve Got Here . . . Is A Failure . . . To
Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation’s Most Common Ethical Complaint, 30 
HAMLINE L. REV. 629 (2007). 
26. W.L.F. Felstiner, Professional Inattention: Origins and Consequences, in THE 
HUMAN FACE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD HARRIS 122 (Keith Hawkins ed., 
1997). 
27. Cf. Don Peters & Martha M. Peters, Maybe That’s Why I Do That: Psychological
Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 169, 172–73 (1990) (research-based models for achieving effective attorney-
client communication “present only basic approaches which often need to be modified to 
meet the specific circumstances presented by particular clients and situations”). 
28. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional
Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 493 (2010) 
(quoting federal Congressional hearing testimony of exoneree Alan J. Crotzer regarding use 
of “Public Pretender” label in Florida). 
29. Cf. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism,
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 485 (1985) (“At various times and in different environments legal aid 
has been justified as advancing values that are not only divergent but often fundamentally 
inconsistent.”). 
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resources from haves to have-nots30 that is animated in part by 
libertarian commitments to methodological individualism and limited 
government power.31 On the other hand, right-to-counsel doctrine is 
informed by egalitarian concerns—albeit concerns that seem to peak 
when the criminalization and racialization of poverty in the United 
States are under especially intense international scrutiny.32 These 
libertarian and egalitarian impulses collude and collide with negative-
rights constitutionalism, capitalist commitments to free markets and low 
taxes, and retributivist suspicion of the criminally accused as deserving 
punishment instead of a publicly funded defense.33 
Amid these shifting constitutional and cultural impulses, austerity is 
a reliable constant that contributes to the Public Pretender stereotype 
and the related, often grim expectations and experiences of people who 
need and provide public defense representation.34 The majority of 
criminal defendants need government-paid lawyers because they cannot 
afford private counsel.35 Prevailing (and arguably mistaken) 
interpretations of Supreme Court case law prevent poor people from 
exercising the Sixth Amendment right to choose an available, qualified, 
willing attorney—a right enjoyed exclusively by defendants who can 
30. See Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move
Beyond Cost–Benefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1025, 1051–58 (2013). 
31. See Alysia Santo, How Conservatives Learned to Love Free Lawyers for the Poor,
POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/24/how-
conservatives-learned-to-love-free-lawyers-for-the-poor-215635 [https://perma.cc/W7UN-
8H7X]; see also Joseph Heath, Methodological Individualism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2015 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/ 
entries/methodological-individualism/ [https://perma.cc/Q395-VBWP]. 
32. See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You:
Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 
1291–96 (2015). 
33. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale & Richard E. Myers II, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 3
(2016) (“Criminal defense lawyers are both expensive and controversial”); Janet Moore, 
Isonomy, Austerity, and the Right to Choose Counsel, 51 IND. L. REV. 167, 185–87 (2018) 
(discussing funding in one Texas county). 
34. See Moore, supra note 33, at 203–06; see also supra notes 2, 7.
35. See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T JUST., NCJ 179023, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http 
://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772 [http://perma.cc/54XC-TNMS] (reporting 
that 82% of criminal defendants facing state-level felony charges in large counties were 
represented by court-appointed counsel); STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S 
DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 158909, INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (1996), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf [https://perma.cc/A85F-PRHU] (“In 1989, nearly 
80% of local jail inmates indicated that they were assigned an attorney to represent them 
for the charges on which they were being held.”). 
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afford to hire counsel.36 This overt, class-based discrimination in the 
vindication of a fundamental right contributes to perceptions that court-
appointed lawyers do not work for the low-income defendants they 
ostensibly represent and that, instead, attorney loyalties lie with the 
government that pays for both the defense and the prosecution.37 
Such perceptions are only strengthened by the fact that public defense 
lawyers are underfunded and overworked.38 Few cases go to trial.39 There 
is often little to no pre-plea communication.40 Attorneys have little time 
to visit people who are incarcerated when they cannot make bond. 
Telephone contact between jails and defender offices is often sharply 
limited or costly. Low-income defendants who can make bond often lack 
access to the stable housing, electronic communication capacity, and 
transportation that are necessary to facilitate communication. 
Thus, instead of counseling individual people, defenders often triage 
case types in a process that is fraught with conflicts of interest and 
susceptible to racial and other biases.41 There is limited regulation of 
attorney performance.42 On the rare occasions when defenders seek 
caseload relief pursuant to constitutional, statutory, or ethical rules, 
judicial concerns about separation of powers—whether coupled with or 
36. But see Moore, supra note 21 (offering arguments for counsel choice in publicly-
funded defense); Moore, supra note 33 (discussing a counsel-choice experiment in Comal 
County, Texas).  
37. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense: How
Free Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System, 666 CATO INST.: POL’Y ANALYSIS, 
Sept. 1, 2010; Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: 
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice 
for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 75–76 (1993). 
38. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE 
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
(2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NGS-3EPM]; Eve 
Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy 
of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013). 
39. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44; Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and
Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARVARD L. REV. 150, 150 (2012). 
40. See BACH, supra note 6; Campbell et al., supra note 2; Dottie Carmichael et al.,
Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads: A Report to the Texas Indigent Defense 
Commission xvi, 20 (2015), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_ 
final.pdf [http://perma.cc/DHJ7-XV7Q] (reflecting trial lawyers’ recommendation that time 
spent communicating with clients should be more than doubled). 
41. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013). 
42. Moore, supra note 21, at 1714–15.
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independent of legislative and executive resistance—often result in little 
more than instructions to continue triaging cases.43 
These obstacles to effective attorney-client communication are 
significant, complex, and recalcitrant.44 They interfere with fair, reliable 
case resolution and with perceptions of system legitimacy. As indicated 
in the Introduction, data from recent pilot studies vividly illustrate these 
harms, their psychic toll on both defendants and defenders, and a shared 
concern to prevent them in the future by improving defendant-defender 
communication.45 
Empirical research cannot cure all of these problems, but it may be 
able to help address them.46 In the shorter term, for example, research 
that focuses specifically on the unique obstacles to attorney-client 
communication in the public defense setting could strive to identify key 
performance indicators for making the most of the limited time that 
defendants and defenders have to communicate, or for overcoming the 
mistrust that many people feel toward government-paid criminal defense 
lawyers. Those performance indicators could then be used to strengthen 
training for law students who plan to handle public defense cases and for 
attorneys already practicing in that field.47 
Evidence-based standards and training will do little to promote 
sustainable improvement, however, if research merely facilitates case 
triage within existing resource constraints.48 In the longer term, data-
informed performance standards could promote systemic change. By 
driving home the importance of communication, such performance 
standards could improve investigation, advocacy, and case outcomes. 
43. Moore et al., supra note 32, at 1301–09; see, e.g., New Mexico ex rel. Bauer v.
Shoobridge, No. 36,375 (N.M. Oct. 11, 2017) (denying relief in one-word order); see NORMAN 
LEFSTEIN, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEF., SECURING 
REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011). 
44. See, e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967); Tigran Eldred, 
Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in 
Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333 (2012); Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 15, 24 (2016). 
45. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, MEASURING JUSTICE: DEFINING
AND EVALUATING QUALITY FOR CRIMINAL LEGAL AID PROVIDERS (2016) (describing national 
and international efforts); Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057, 1069–81 (2015). 
47. See, e.g., THE SIMULATED CLIENT INITIATIVE, http://zeugma.typepad.com/ [https://
perma.cc/72ZT-KVDE] (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) (“an international collaboration to develop 
a research base and resources for the use of simulated clients in legal education”). 
48. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 41; cf. Felstiner, supra note 26, at 140–42 
(emphasizing need to address resource constraints to improve attorney-client relations). 
2018] PRIVILEGING PUBLIC DEFENSE RESEARCH 777 
They could promote healthier defender cultures by strengthening 
recruitment and performance evaluation processes, as well as the self-
perceptions of defenders regarding their role and mission.49 Evidence-
based standards for defendant-defender communication also could 
support demands for the lower caseloads and increased resources that 
would likely be required to meet those standards.50 
Such demands could become more frequent and effective if defendants 
and their communities engage with research-based attorney performance 
standards through rights-information, satisfaction-feedback, and 
community organizing tools and strategies that increase pressure to 
achieve and exceed those standards.51 As illustrated by the participatory 
defense movement, this type of concerted political pressure could 
productively disrupt courtroom workgroups that otherwise focus 
primarily on efficient case processing.52 Since attorney performance 
standards are built into the substantive meaning of the right to counsel, 
the day-to-day, case-by-case enforcement of higher performance 
standards by people in the trenches of public defense systems should 
eventually receive judicial acknowledgment in court rulings, thereby 
strengthening the content of constitutional law.53 
Research is needed to begin working toward these goals. Law lags far 
behind medicine and other professions in pursuing and using research on 
effective communication.54 Moreover, the few published studies on 
49. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the
Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and 
Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161 (2009). 
50. Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendan
ts/ls_sclaid_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/Q2E9-D46U] (requiring defenders to decline new cases and, where necessary, seek to 
withdraw from current cases when excessive caseloads prevent compliance with 
constitutional and ethical standards); Moore et al., supra note 32, at 1303–09 (discussing 
system-impact litigation strategies); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2013) (discussing defender strategies). 
51. Moore et al., supra note 32, at 1281–91, 1309–16; see also Michelle Alexander,
Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.ht 
ml [http://perma.cc/A87K-7SWR] (discussing proposal of justice reform activist Susan 
Burton for mass rejection of plea offers in favor of demands to take cases to trial).  
52. Moore et al., supra note 32.
53. Moore, supra note 21, at 1706–09, 1723–25.
54. Clark D. Cunningham, Evaluating Effective Lawyer-Client Communication: An
International Project Moving From Research To Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1959, 1959–
64 (1999); see also, e.g., Thijs Fassaert et al., Active Listening in Medical Consultations: 
Development of the Active Listening Observation Scale (ALOS-Global), 68 PATIENT EDUC. 
& COUNSELING 258 (2007).  
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attorney-client communication often focus on civil cases. Those that 
touch on public defense rarely tap defendant perspectives. Researchers 
also tend to rely on role-playing simulations or on post hoc reflections of 
lawyers and clients instead of conducting direct observation of real-time 
communication. This is so in part because injecting researchers into the 
defendant-defender relationship implicates core principles of legal ethics, 
related constitutional and evidentiary rules, and federally-regulated 
research ethics. Parts III and IV explore these problems and offer 
possible strategies for addressing them. 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODS, AND THEORIES
This Part describes research methods and theories that have been or 
could be applied in studying communication between government-paid 
criminal defense lawyers and the people who need them. Part III.A offers 
a brief overview of the relevant literature and highlights the lack of 
published studies focusing specifically on public defense. Part III.B 
suggests a strategy for filling that gap. 
A.  Accomplishments and Gaps in the Research 
Research on attorney-client communication can be roughly categorized 
into three methodologies, each with a dominant theoretical approach. 
The first category involves direct observation of attorney-client 
communication. This category emerged with the law and society 
movement’s promotion of interdisciplinary research on law as a social 
construct. The second category developed as ethical, legal, and practical 
barriers limited access to direct observation of attorney-client 
communications. Experts in clinical legal education led a shift toward the 
use of discourse analysis to evaluate simulated encounters. The third 
category uses mixed-method inquiries (interviews, focus groups, and 
surveys) to collect and analyze reported expectations, experiences, and 
perceptions of attorneys and clients. These studies often invoke 
procedural justice theory, which posits that perceptions of fair treatment 
outweigh substantive outcomes in generating expressions of satisfaction, 
appreciation for system legitimacy, and compliance with system 
directives. These three approaches are discussed serially in the 
subsections that follow. 
1. Direct Observation of Attorney-Client Communication
Studies involving direct observation of attorney-client communication 
tend to interrogate those interactions as sites of negotiated power. They 
also tend to focus on two types of research settings. The first setting 
involves people who cannot afford to hire counsel, with research 
2018] PRIVILEGING PUBLIC DEFENSE RESEARCH 779 
occurring in public defense agencies, legal aid offices, or law school 
clinics.55 The second setting involves private attorneys, who researchers 
describe as occupying a somewhat lower status vis-à-vis their peers, and 
whose financially-stressed clients seek assistance with divorce56 or 
bankruptcy.57 
These studies diverge in the extent to which researchers acknowledge 
and try to address the confidentiality and privilege issues triggered by 
researcher presence during attorney-client communication.58 Rules of 
legal ethics and evidentiary privilege prioritize confidentiality, trust, and 
the privacy of communication.59 In the context of criminal defense, the 
same interests implicate constitutional rights and duties.60 The result is 
a cone of silence around attorney-client communication which, absent a 
waiver by the client or other narrow exceptions, protects those 
communications from disclosure. 
Injecting a third party, such as a researcher, into attorney-client 
communication compromises the privilege and could lead to the forced 
disclosure of that communication in court. In the context of public defense 
research, prosecutors might issue such demands, but so might defense 
lawyers seeking information either to implicate a co-defendant or to 
support an ineffective assistance claim against a lawyer who participated 
in the study as a research subject. 
The next two subsections trace the growing awareness among 
researchers of these confidentiality and privilege concerns. The first 
subsection discusses studies in which researchers report on direct 
observation of attorney-client communication without addressing the 
ethical and evidentiary issues implicated by their presence during those 
55. See, e.g., Carl J. Hosticka, We Don’t Care about What Happened, We Only Care
about What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 599 
(1978); David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public 
Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965).  
56. Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669–70, 1670 n.41 (1989). 
57. Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and
Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177 (1986). 
58. See Clark D. Cunningham & Bonnie S. McElhinny, Taking It to the Streets: Putting
Discourse Analysis to the Service of a Public Defender’s Office, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 285, 286–87, 
291–96 (1995). 
59. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20; Freedman, supra note 20; Sue
Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in Two Different Applications 
(American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, May 2007), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
confidentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/53FS-YEWT]. 
60. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE 
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 58–63 (2009). 
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communications. The second subsection discusses studies that highlight 
these ethical and evidentiary issues, the resulting difficulties in 
recruiting research participants, and a corresponding shift toward 
alternative methodologies and theoretical frameworks. 
a. Direct-Observation Studies That Do Not Discuss
Confidentiality and Privilege 
Two studies involving direct observation of attorney-client 
communication in a public defense setting underscore the depressing 
lack of progress over the past half-century in improving either that 
communication or the meet-’em-and-plead-’em approach that feeds the 
Public Pretender stereotype.61 To be clear, neither of these projects 
focused specifically on defendant-defender communication as a central 
subject of inquiry. Instead, the researchers embedded themselves in their 
research sites (a public defense office and a busy urban court system, 
respectively) for extended periods of time. Sudnow’s 1965 study appears 
to be the earliest to report on defendant-defender exchanges, but those 
reports are a small part of a broader investigation into public defense as 
a social phenomenon shaped by criminal codes.62 The 2016 study by 
Gonzalez Van Cleve offers data on defendant-defender communication 
that emerged during research on criminal legal systems as sites of 
ostensibly colorblind but thoroughly racist punishment.63 
Despite the fact that neither of these studies focused specifically on 
attorney-client communication in the public defense context, the direct 
observation of defendant-defender interactions by these researchers 
revealed evidence of dehumanization that may have been otherwise 
invisible to a wider public.64 Sudnow described the bulk of defender 
activity as the swift sorting of clients into case types—with little to no 
defendant-defender communication—to dispatch them efficiently 
through a courtroom workgroup.65 In contrast, private counsel appeared 
as disrupters who challenged judges and prosecutors while fighting 
aggressively for individual people.66 
61. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT xiii-xiv, 3–6, 21–32 (2016); Sudnow, supra note 55, 
at 265–69. 
62. Sudnow, supra note 55, at 264–66.
63. GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 61, at xii–iv (describing how the project’s 104
interviews engaged “judges, prosecutors, and public defenders” instead of people who 
needed public defense because “plenty of ethnographic studies turn the lens on 
marginalized populations”).  
64. Id. at 196; Sudnow, supra note 55, at 264–74.
65. Sudnow, supra note 55, at 264–74.
66. Id. at 273–74.
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Gonzalez Van Cleve’s clerkship with a public defense office allowed her 
to witness firsthand how a white lawyer’s rejection of black speech shut 
down a potential avenue for investigation.67 When the defendant, Tyrell, 
tried to describe an alibi witness, his lawyer, Kevin, asked, 
“What’s his name?” [Tyrell] paused and said, “We call him ‘Preacher.’” 
Kevin asked, “What congregation?” Tyrell snapped as though the 
question was irrelevant, “No congregation. We just call him dat.” 
Kevin stopped writing and the pen slowed in his hand at the mention 
of a witness with a neighborhood nickname . . . . Once Kevin stopped 
writing, the conference ended. It was clear to me that he was not going 
to call this witness unless Tyrell called the Preacher by a name deemed 
credible within the court community, presumably a white name that 
would not be mocked.68 
We need not argue that the methods or conclusions of this study were 
flawless69 to make several points. First, the information about the effects 
of race on defendant-defender communication resonates with other 
studies and warrants further exploration.70 Second, direct observation of 
attorney-client communications in both studies revealed additional 
details that may otherwise have remained hidden. Those details include 
the length or brevity of the communication, the quantity and type of 
information exchanged, the proportion of open-ended versus leading 
questions, and variations in responses to those different question types. 
Third, insights into such details could inform strategies to improve 
defendant-defender communication through additional empirical 
research and related, data-informed law student and attorney 
recruitment, training, and evaluation protocols.71 Finally, the same 
information could inform rights-information and satisfaction-feedback 
67. GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, supra note 61, at 165–66.
68. Id.
69. See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal
Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 864, 865–66 (2017) (critiquing focus on overt racial bias); id. at 
873–74 (discussing limitations of qualitative analysis). 
70. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 2, at 764; Moore & Davies, supra note 1, at
362; Kenneth Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black 
Defendant’s Concerns About Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 L. & INEQ. 
1 (2002). For similar observations on the role of gender in structuring power and speech, 
see, e.g., Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes 
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 6–19 (1990). 
71. See Rapping, supra note 49; Richardson, supra note 69, at 890–92.
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tools to tap perspectives and promote effective reform-oriented 
community organizing among people who need public defense.72 
While the foregoing studies involved public defense, other direct-
observation research involved attorneys and clients in civil settings. 
Goldsmith was a pre-law student director of a university clinic for fellow 
students when he became concerned about obvious dissatisfaction with 
the clinic on the part of both students and their volunteer lawyers. 
Goldsmith designed a research project that included direct observation 
of initial attorney-client interviews. He found that lawyers perceived 
communication as more productive than did clients, with disparities 
including the role of emotion and the quality of information-sharing. 
Attorneys saw excessively emotional clients as disruptive, while clients 
were put off by the lack of attorney empathy. Attorney interruptions and 
leading questions shut down communication while open-ended questions 
were more productive.73 
Hosticka reached similar conclusions after observing interviews in a 
legal aid office. He found that lawyers missed opportunities to share 
information and identify legal issues when they dominated discussion.74 
Conversely, lawyers invested more time and effort on clients who 
persisted in advancing their views (or from counsel’s perspective, were 
disruptive).75 Like Hosticka, Sarat and Felstiner investigated 
communications as a form of negotiation over power and meaning, but 
did so by observing attorney-client conferences in divorce cases.76 They 
also differed from Hosticka in finding that clients were “rarely simply 
acquiescent” to attorney dominance but instead “maneuver[ed], more or 
less overtly, to get [their] ideas and interpretations heard and 
accepted.”77 
72. See Campbell et al., supra note 2; Moore et al., supra note 32, at 1309–15; Sandys
& Pruss, supra note 2; David W. Walker, Citizen-Driven Reform of Local-Level Basic 
Services: Community-Based Performance Monitoring, 19 DEV. IN PRAC. 1035 (2009). 
73. John Daniel Goldsmith, The Initial Attorney/Client Consultation: A Case History,
45 S. SPEECH COMM. J. 394, 398–405 (1980). 
74. Hosticka, supra note 55, at 609–10.
75. Id. at 607.
76. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 56.
77. AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 7–8
(1995); see also Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a 
Radical Conception, 7 INT’L J. SOC. L. 331, 352–53 (1979) (reaching similar conclusions after 
observing communications between clients and four English solicitors in 82 cases). For 
examples of additional studies outside of the United States, see Karen Barton et al., Valuing 
What Clients Think: Standardized Clients and Assessment of Communicative Competence, 
13 CLIN. L. REV. 1, 9–11, 9 n.17 (2006). 
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b. Direct-Observation Studies That Discuss Confidentia- 
 lity and Privilege Issues 
The authors of the foregoing studies did not discuss the ways that their 
activities implicated legal and ethical rules designed to protect the 
communication they were studying.78 A different set of researchers 
recognized these concerns; some tried to address them while others 
minimized their importance. Neustadter, a law professor with a 
background as a legal aid attorney, warned lawyers and clients in 
bankruptcy cases that his presence could lead to the forced disclosure of 
their communications in court, although he described the risk as “very 
unlikely.”79 Like prior studies, Neustadter’s research reveals how 
resource constraints can cause communication to be compressed, 
routinized, and dominated by counsel.80 The author also emphasized that 
direct observation of attorney-client interactions can reveal insights into 
decision making that are otherwise inaccessible.81 
Gellhorn et al. argued similarly that the rewards of observing 
interviews between supervised law students and clients in a disability 
rights clinic outweighed the risks that otherwise confidential and 
privileged communication could be subject to forced disclosure.82 These 
authors concluded that their research provided “new and startling 
insights about the power of language and speech encounters,” mainly by 
revealing tensions between the lawyer’s need to gather information and 
the client’s need to be understood at an affective as well as a cognitive 
level.83 Unlike Neustadter, these social scientists did not inform clients 
of disclosure risks because they saw clinic cases as non-adversarial; 
believed the content of the communications had mostly been made public; 
viewed themselves as members of the legal team; and valued their work 
equally with interests protected by marital, journalistic, and other 
evidentiary privileges.84 
Cunningham and McElhinny were the first scholars to conduct direct 
observation of attorney-client communication while providing in-depth 
analysis of the ethical and evidentiary problems triggered by their 
78. See Cunningham & McElhinny, supra note 58, at 286–87, 291–96.
79. Neustadter, supra note 57, at 280–83, 281 n.179; see also White, supra note 70, at
21 n.78 (addressing confidentiality concerns). 
80. Neustadter, supra note 57, at 178.
81. Id. at 179.
82. Gay Gellhorn et al., Law and Language: An Interdisciplinary Study of Client
Interviews, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 245, 269–75 (1994). 
83. Id. at 295.
84. Id. at 273–74. For development of the latter argument in the public defense context,
see infra Part IV. 
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participant-observer status.85 They also appear to be the first to focus 
their research specifically on communication in public defense. Like 
Neustadter—and unlike Sudnow and Gonzalez Van Cleve—Cunningham 
was a practicing lawyer before he undertook interdisciplinary empirical 
research.86 He and McElhinny expanded on Gellhorn et al.’s proposal by 
embedding themselves as contributing members of the defense team who 
aimed to improve communication while maintaining confidentiality and 
all applicable privileges.87 
Although Cunningham and McElhinny provide a thoughtful, detailed 
description of their project design and preliminary steps in 
implementation, it does not appear that data from this study were ever 
made public. Even so, taken as a body of literature, the available direct-
observation research raises important questions for public defense. 
Those questions include whether, when, and how clients push back 
against attorneys who dominate discussions, express bias, neglect affect 
as a component of information sharing, or otherwise undermine effective 
communication. Additional questions include whether, when, and how 
such resistance can (as Hosticka’s research indicates) reshape 
understandings, experiences, and expectations of the right to counsel—
in part by motivating defenders to incorporate defendant input more 
fully, to work harder, and perhaps to achieve better results.88 
2. Actors and Avatars: Evaluating Communication Through
Role-Playing 
Despite the productivity of direct observation, its use discourages 
participation by attorneys and clients alike.89 Difficulties in recruiting 
participants for this type of research arise from concerns that a 
researcher’s presence inevitably interferes with the attorney-client 
relationship, alters the flow and content of communication, and 
abrogates confidentiality and privilege protections.90 As these concerns 
mounted, studies shifted toward the use of simulated encounters. This 
move was led by experts in clinical legal education who drew from 
training and evaluation programs for medical students. Their research 
85. Cunningham & McElhinny, supra note 58.
86. Id. at 285–87.
87. Id.
88. Hosticka, supra note 55, at 609–10.
89. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 179–80
(1974); Brenda Danet et al., Obstacles to the Study of the Lawyer-Client Interaction: the 
Biography of a Failure, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 905 (1980); Neustadter, supra note 57, at 177–
78, 180–82. 
90. Danet et al., supra note 89.
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often focuses on analysis of speech patterns; it aims to produce reliable, 
measurable performance indicators; and, through the abundant energy 
of Cunningham and colleagues, it has expanded into an international 
research consortium.91 
Simulations involve interactions between non-lawyer members of the 
community or actors who are trained to role-play clients seeking 
assistance from law students or bar candidates based on hypothetical fact 
patterns.92 The “clients,” “lawyers,” or teacher-evaluators then assess 
“lawyer” performance and subsequent training addresses any identified 
deficits.93 As summarized by Barton et al., prior research supported a 
“basic consensus” about strategies for improving communication: reduce 
interruption and reframing of client stories; provide more background 
information on the law to contextualize attorney questions and facilitate 
client comprehension; and share more control over the case with clients.94 
More detailed criteria involve body language, vocal modulation, 
translation of jargon, face-saving, and timing (including the strategic use 
of silence and sequencing)—all with the aim of ensuring that clients 
“understand and accept the . . . opportunities, risks, and consequences of 
law and process in their circumstances” while feeling “full trust and 
confidence in their lawyers’ advocacy, competence, motive, and respect.”95 
Data from these simulations may be applicable to public defense, but 
it does not appear that these studies have accounted for the distinctive 
set of obstacles to defendant-defender communication embodied in the 
Public Pretender stereotype. For example, it is unclear whether 
simulations have involved the intensely compressed time periods, high 
stakes, and raucous jail pod or court hallway settings in which much 
defendant-defender communication occurs. Nor is it obvious that people 
who have the time and resources to role-play clients and evaluate 
students would be readily able to grasp and channel the experiences, 
expectations, and responses of people who need public defense 
representation. 
91. Barton et al., supra note 77, at 1; Wilson Chow & Michael Ng, Legal Education
Without the Law—Lay Clients as Teachers and Assessors in Communication Skills, 22 INT’L 
J. LEGAL PROF. 103 (2015); THE SIMULATED CLIENT INITIATIVE, supra note 47. 
92. Barton et al., supra note 77, at 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 8; ROSENTHAL, supra note 89, at 3 (reporting that greater client participation
improves case outcomes). 
95. MARJORIE CORMAN AARON, CLIENT SCIENCE 2, 4-7, 9-18, 25-27 (2012); see also
Linda F. Smith, Client-Lawyer Talk: Lessons From Other Disciplines, 13 CLIN. L. REV. 505 
(2006); Linda F. Smith, Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the “Traditional” 
Interview and the “Client-Centered” Interview, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 541 (1995). 
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Given these challenges, the early state of simulation studies, and the 
time- and labor-intensive nature of even the most efficient approaches to 
role-played interactions, advancing knowledge through the use of 
machine-learning computer avatars might seem less far-fetched than on 
first glance. Indeed, that approach may offer levels of efficiency and 
accessibility particularly well-suited to the unique needs of public 
defense. Recent advances in technology have laid the foundation for 
creating “a sufficiently authentic simulated digital client.”96 Machine 
learning may allow virtual clients to alter responses by responding to 
environmental cues,97 including body language.98 Gaming technology 
could mimic time constraints and other environmental challenges.99 
Thus, in the not too distant future, for simulation studies of attorney-
client communication in the public defense context, there could be “an 
app for that.”100 
3. Mixed Methods and Procedural Justice
While awaiting the development of machine-learning client avatars as 
the next wave of simulation studies on attorney-client communication, 
there is a third category of relevant research that largely avoids both the 
ethical and evidentiary concerns raised by direct observation and the 
authenticity and replicability concerns raised by using role-played 
simulations. This third category of research uses mixed method inquiries 
(interviews, focus groups, and surveys)101 with lawyers and clients to 
collect and analyze their reported expectations, experiences, and 
perceptions about their interactions. As discussed in a comprehensive 
literature review by Sandys and Pruss, these studies underscore the 
relationship between communication, investigation, and advocacy and 
are often informed by procedural justice theory.102 That approach frames 
perceptions of fair treatment as having greater salience than substantive 
96. Zariski, supra note 11, at 4–5.
97. Yuesheng He & Yuan Yan Tang, Autonomous Behaviors Of Graphical Avatars
Based On Machine Learning, 26 INT. J. PATT. RECOGN. ARTIF. INTELL. 1251002 (2012). 
98. Fatma Nasoz & Christine L. Lisetti, MAUI Avatars: Mirroring the User’s Sensed
Emotions Via Expressive Multi-Ethnic Facial Avatars, 17 J. VISUAL LANGUAGES & 
COMPUTING 430 (2006); George Veletsianos et al., Conversational Agents in Virtual Worlds: 
Bridging Disciplines, 41 BRIT. J. EDUC. TECH. 123 (2010). 
99. Zariski, supra note 11, at 6–8.
100. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). 
 101. See JOHN CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING MIXED 
METHODS RESEARCH (2011). 
102. Sandys & Pruss, supra note 2, at 435–44; see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 89, at 5 
(discussing use of interviews and surveys in civil setting). 
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outcomes in generating reports of participant satisfaction as well as 
belief in, and deference to, system legitimacy.103 
These mixed-method studies tend to support inferences from direct-
observation and simulation research by documenting unique obstacles to 
communication in public defense,104 identifying mismatches between 
attorneys and clients in assessing the importance of interpersonal 
skills,105 and highlighting the value of attorney openness to client input 
and participation.106 These studies also offer measures and tools that 
may be helpful both in advancing next-stage mixed-methods research 
and adapting direct-observation and simulation methods to the public 
defense context.107 
However, future research agendas might benefit from exploring 
alternatives to procedural justice theory and the related emphasis on 
satisfaction and compliance. Moreover, regardless of the theory 
undergirding mixed-methods research, there are several reasons why 
direct, real-time observation offers advantages over those methods. The 
following section develops these ideas while sketching strategies for 
future research on attorney-client communication in the public defense 
setting. 
B.  Designing Future Research 
Research on public defense faces a conundrum. There is a significant 
need both for sound social science research on the quality of attorney-
client communication in public defense and for strategies to address the 
 103. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 2. For additional descriptions and critiques of 
procedural justice theory, see, e.g., Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural 
Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 119 (2012); Devon Johnson, Edward R. Maguire & Joseph B. Kuhns, Public 
Perceptions of the Legitimacy of the Law and Legal Authorities: Evidence from the 
Caribbean, 48 L. & SOC’Y REV. 947 (2014); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and 
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
171, 188–93 (2005); Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public 
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103 (2013). 
 104. Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had 
a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4, 4–5 (1971).  
 105. Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal 
Defense Attorney from the Client’s Perspective: Empirical Findings and Implications for 
Legal Practice, 25 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 96 (2001).  
 106. Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Development and Effects of Client Trust in Criminal 
Defense Attorneys: Preliminary Examination of the Congruence Model of Trust 
Development, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197 (2004).  
 107. See, e.g., Sandys & Pruss, supra note 2, at 451, 456–57 (describing survey prompts 
such as “My attorney does what s/he says s/he will do”; “My attorney tries to get me the 
help that I need”; “My attorney has a team in his office that helps with my case”). 
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ethical and legal concerns implicated by such studies. Such research has 
the potential to spur the development of evidence-based communication 
techniques, thereby offering (as in other evidence-based domains) 
prescribed techniques and interventions that are effective. Just as 
research might show a treatment program is (or is not) effective and can 
(or cannot) be replicated elsewhere, research could be used to develop 
guidance on how to achieve high quality defendant-defender 
communication. Research could tell us what works, what does not, and 
what we should change. 
A sample research plan for building that foundation would begin with 
researchers identifying the meaning of “good” communication in terms of 
behaviors and outcomes: clients who are fully informed of all requisite 
information, who trust their lawyers, and feel empowered to make 
important decisions, for example.108 Researchers would determine ways 
to measure these factors, incorporating prior research as well as new 
exploratory observations of attorney-client communication to be sure 
their decisions are grounded in basic knowledge of the phenomenon 
under study. Additional mixed-method tools (interviews, focus groups, 
group-level assessments, and surveys) would help establish conceptual 
clarity around the nature of “good” communication. 
After identifying indicators that are of interest and can be feasibly 
observed, researchers would conduct those observations and analyze the 
results. In an iterative process, those results would likely inform new, 
more precise measurement tools. Should early work identify the use of 
legal jargon as a barrier, for example, subsequent research could 
investigate the terminology used and assess the impact of alternative 
language. Variations in the timing, type, and frequency of 
communication could be evaluated. For example, might holding regular 
office hours for pretrial detainees who otherwise have limited access to 
their public defense lawyers improve communication, investigation, and 
advocacy?109 
Research could also explore links between communication and other 
matters of interest, such as how cases are resolved as well as life 
trajectories of defendants and broader reform in public defense and 
criminal legal systems. Intriguing questions include: What factors enable 
people to experience public defense as an opportunity to exercise agency 
and to act on that opportunity? Can those experiences and activities 
promote sustainable improvement in case outcomes and system 
operations? If so, under what conditions? How do “taken for granted” 
background assumptions, such as excessive attorney workloads and lack 
108. See AARON, supra note 95, at 4–9. 
109. The Authors are grateful to Marla Sandys for posing this question. 
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of resources, become subject to effective challenge? Do rights-information 
and satisfaction-feedback tools change the calculus?110 
The latter questions could be grounded in theoretical approaches that 
respond to some limitations in the procedural justice framework. For 
example, while mixed-method studies applying that framework tend to 
explore the relationship between satisfaction, perceptions of system 
legitimacy, and compliance, it is important to note that the relationship 
between satisfaction and the actual quality of products or services is 
complex and contested, including in research fields such as consumer 
sciences and medicine that are much further advanced on the issue than 
law.111 Put bluntly, expressions of satisfaction in the public defense 
context may reflect the boiled-frog perspective: people are so accustomed 
to abysmal conditions and performance, and their expectations are so 
badly degraded, that satisfaction could signal harm instead of health. 
The suggestion of one research participant, noted in the Introduction, 
that the time allocated for defendant-defender communication be 
increased from three to ten minutes illustrates this phenomenon. 
In searching for alternative theoretical frameworks to support 
inquiries into defendant-defender communication as a potential site of 
productive disruption instead of satisfaction and compliance, researchers 
might look to Silbey’s work on legal consciousness.112 Silbey’s 
prescriptions for research on the social construction of legal meaning 
offers conceptual support for inquiry into explanations for the presence 
or absence of the discontent and resistance that may be needed to spark 
sustainable improvement of overloaded, under-resourced public defense 
systems.113 
If methodology follows theory, there is little question that direct 
observation has significant potential for productive disruption. To be 
sure, mixed-methods approaches and simulation studies offer important 
insights and must be incorporated into any future agenda for research on 
communication in public defense. Nevertheless, those methods share a 
significant limitation: neither involves the sine qua non of the scientific 
method, which is direct observation of the subject at issue. 
110. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 111. See, e.g., RICHARD L. OLIVER, SATISFACTION: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
CONSUMER (2d ed. 2010); Matthew P. Manary et al., The Patient Experience and Health 
Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201 (2013); Melissa Bekelja Wanzer et al., Perceptions of 
Health Care Providers’ Communication: Relationships Between Patient-Centered 
Communication and Satisfaction, 16 HEALTH COMM. 363 (2004). 
112. Susan Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323 (2005). 
113. Id.; see also Danet et al., supra note 89. Moore et al., supra note 7 explores such 
theoretical reframing. 
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For example, mixed-method research has revealed that people who 
have had public defense lawyers in the past and who report that their 
attorneys listened to them also state that they were more satisfied with 
those attorneys.114 Yet we should be cautious before concluding that by 
listening, better attorneys can make their clients more satisfied. These 
researchers did not observe how much attorneys actually listened but 
rather asked clients how much they thought their attorneys listened. The 
research finding is therefore a statistical correlation between two client 
perceptions: first, that lawyers were attentive and, second, that attorney 
performance was satisfactory overall. All such research can tell us is that 
clients who perceived their attorneys in such ways were more satisfied; 
it cannot tell us what produced those perceptions, let alone whether they 
are related to how the attorney and client actually communicated. 
Without observing attorney-client communication itself, therefore, there 
are significant limitations to our ability ever to develop an evidence-
based approach to the subject. 
A recent study quantitatively expressed the limitation imposed by the 
inability to observe attorney-client communication. When defendants 
and defenders who had litigated a case together were asked if they had 
ever disagreed with each other during the case, over twice as many 
defendants than defenders said yes (50%–20%); on the other hand, 
defenders were far more confident than defendants (93%–67%) that 
defendants understood the defender’s role.115 These disparities are 
important and warrant further investigation, but neither simulation 
approaches nor mixed-method approaches could reveal why defendants 
and defenders remember things so differently. Was the attorney not 
speaking loudly enough? Were there language barriers? Are some people 
simply bad at signaling, or recognizing signals of, confusion, boredom, or 
disengagement? Do attorneys and clients distrust, fear, or dislike one 
another? Do attorneys simply avoid admitting that their clients might 
have misunderstood them? What amounts of disregard, delusion, or 
dissembling are at play? Are any of these factors distinctive to the public 
defense setting? Without observing attorney-client communication 
directly, the quantitative differences in attorney and client perceptions 
reported by the researchers defy interpretation. 
Direct observation of attorney-client communication allows 
researchers to explore these and other questions by collecting data that 
114. Campbell et al., supra note 2; Sandys & Pruss, supra note 2. 
 115. Chelsea Davis et al., “A Little Communication Would Have Been Nice, Since This 
Is My Life”: Defendant Views on the Attorney Client Relationship, THE CHAMPION 28, at 29, 
31 (2016); see also Goldsmith, supra note 73 (noting disagreements in post-hoc evaluations 
by attorneys and clients of their interactions). 
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are unavailable by any other method. Only direct observation can reveal 
content, terminology, body language, tone of voice, and context: how 
crowded or noisy is the space? Are participants being hurried along? 
Direct observation can also expose otherwise unnoticed or unreportable 
factors such as misheard comments and moments of distraction, 
repetition, or irritation. 
By juxtaposing these observations with information on what 
participants in these conversations recalled, researchers could see what 
was different about conversations that resulted in higher levels of 
comprehension, agreement, or trust. That foundation could support an 
evidence-based communication practice that offers guidance for making 
communication more successful. Important extensions would also be 
possible. Research could examine differences in predictors of success for 
cross-racial or cross-gender attorney-client dyads, for example, or adjust 
for communication that occurs electronically or within different time 
limits, across different time spans, and with different degrees of 
frequency. 
Of course, even observation of communication has its limitations. For 
example, one cannot observe a person’s motivations directly. If attorneys 
communicate in a certain style because they are fearful of their client, 
are intrinsically aloof, or are simply very hungry, one will not necessarily 
know it from observing the communication. 
Another important concern arises from a variation of the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle: 
Every observation in a social context changes the object of 
observation . . . this transaction . . . is one of the most dreaded 
characteristics of knowledge production in the social sciences. If the 
act of perception itself modifies the epistemic object, any claim to 
objective measurement is questioned in a fundamental way.116 
Although “some social scientists spend much effort” on addressing this 
problem,117 at least one set of researchers on attorney-client 
communication discounted it on the basis that practice and personality 
 116. Franz Breuer & Wolff-Michael Roth, Subjectivity and Reflexivity in the Social 
Sciences: Epistemic Windows and Methodical Consequences, 4 FORUM: QUALITATIVE SOC. 
RES., art. 25, sec. 1.4, para. 7 (2003), http://nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0302258 
[https://perma.cc/67PE-AK95]. 
 117. Id. Social scientists label the problem “the Hawthorn effect.” Barbara L. Paterson, 
A Framework to Identify Reactivity in Qualitative Research, 16 W. J. NURSING RES. 301 
(1994). The Authors thank participants in the Indigent Defense Research Association 
[IDRA] listserv for insight on this point. 
 792 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69 
leave lawyer behavior “so ingrained” that researcher presence would 
have little effect.118 
Whether or not the latter assumption is accurate regarding attorney 
behavior, the assumption does not account for the possible effects of 
researcher presence on the client. Nor does it account for the reciprocal 
possibility that the people and behaviors observed could affect the 
researcher.119 Neustadter provides a salient illustration of the latter 
problem, explaining that he self-censored his report on attorney-client 
interactions in order to avoid offending his lawyer-subjects and deterring 
attorney participation in future studies.120 
Despite all of the foregoing concerns with direct observation, the 
method offers otherwise unavailable insights into the quality of 
defendant-defender communication, including correlations between what 
actually happens in the room and what the participants recall later. 
These insights, in turn, could provide a foundation for recommending 
interventions or course corrections that could alter behavior and 
outcomes for the better. As such questions are explored through 
increasingly refined research, and as findings from different projects 
refute or reinforce one another, a clear set of guidelines could emerge for 
promoting optimally effective defendant-defender communication and 
related outcomes. Part IV addresses a major hurdle to progress on this 
front: the need for robust protection of confidential information to which 
researchers may have access during the data collection process. 
IV. PRIVILEGING RESEARCH ON COMMUNICATION IN PUBLIC DEFENSE
Obstacles to undertaking the research plan sketched in Part III.B 
include ethical and legal rules that protect the very defendant-defender 
communication that is to be studied. This Part summarizes strategies for 
addressing those concerns. Part A sets the context by highlighting 
intersections between two areas of law that are rarely analyzed in 
tandem.  The first area of law involves research ethics, a complex body of 
federal regulations that tends to draw little attention from legal scholars.  
The second area of law involves the confidentiality concerns that animate 
legal ethics and evidentiary privilege rules. Part B examines the 
intersection between these two areas of law more closely. This section 
explains how protections that are mandated by research ethics can be 
supplemented by development of an evidentiary privilege to shield 
observed defendant-defender communications from forced disclosure. 
 118. Neustadter, supra note 57, at 181 & n.10 (discussing grant proposal drafted by 
Felstiner et al.).  
119. See Paterson, supra note 117.  
120. Neustadter, supra note 57, at 181–82. 
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Because such protections remain nascent and uncertain, public defense 
researchers must be rigorous in project design and implementation to 
avoid harming the people who engage with them as research subjects. 
A.   Communication Research and Research Ethics 
Injecting researchers into the attorney-client dyad implicates core 
principles of legal ethics and professionalism, related constitutional and 
evidentiary rules, and federally mandated regulations governing 
research ethics. Rules of legal ethics and evidentiary privilege prioritize 
confidentiality, trust, and the privacy of communication.121  In the 
context of criminal defense, the same interests implicate constitutional 
rights and duties.122 
These protections have overlapping and distinguishing 
characteristics. We use the term “confidentiality” to refer to information 
provided by a client or potential client to an attorney that relates to the 
representation and is protected by rules of professional conduct that are 
enforced by disciplinary actions bodies.123  Attorney-client privilege is an 
evidentiary rule that is enforced by judges in court and encompasses 
communications from a client to his or her counsel or counsel’s agent 
about the subject of the representation, made in confidence, and provided 
with the aim of obtaining legal advice and not advice for a future crime 
or fraud.124  The result is a cone of silence around attorney-client 
communication, which, absent a waiver by the client or other narrow 
exceptions, protects those communications from disclosure. 
Research ethics protect a different set of interests. This system has 
three core principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. 
Correlative duties include preventing unnecessary risks to people who 
participate as subjects of research while providing special protections for 
vulnerable populations; ensuring that research benefits outweigh any 
risks; and promoting fair distribution of those risks and benefits. 
Researchers must also ensure that people who participate as subjects of 
research do so only after providing fully informed, voluntary consent, and 
must protect participants’ privacy and the confidentiality of any data 
 121. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20; Freedman supra note 20; 
Michmerhuizen, supra note 59. 
122. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 60. 
123. See Michmerhuizen, supra note 59. 
124. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20. 
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they provide.125 These obligations are embodied in the Code of Federal 
Regulations and are referred to collectively as “The Common Rule.”126 
Research ethics requirements give rise to distinctive concerns in the 
context of defendant-defender communication. Those concerns have 
received little attention in the literature. There are several possible 
explanations for this inattention. Social science research on public 
defense is a relatively new field. People who study public defense—and 
the institutional review boards that enforce research ethics 
requirements—may lack legal training, trial experience, or experience 
working within criminal defense or public defense systems.127 As a result, 
there may be limited sensitivity to the distinctive ethical and legal 
concerns that arise from studying attorney-client communication in 
those contexts. 
However, those concerns warrant heightened attention when research 
subjects are low-income people who require government-paid criminal 
defense counsel. That status entails certain vulnerabilities toward which 
ethical and legal rules are rightly attentive.128 Indeed, attorney-client 
relationships in this context often are already fraught due to the 
frustrations and low expectations embodied in the Public Pretender 
stereotype.129 Introducing a third-party observer into that relationship 
requires particularly careful navigation of competing needs and 
interests. At the same time, where there is reason to believe that an 
intervention can improve representation, additional research ethics 
concerns arise if experimental design grants that potential benefit to one 
group and denies it to another.130 These concerns must be accounted for 
as researchers work with defendants and defenders in designing and 
implementing studies that focus on the quality of communication in 
public defense. 
This Article cabins difficult questions about whether and under what 
conditions people who need public defense representation should be 
asked for permission to allow researchers to inject themselves into 
 125. Carol A. Heimer & JuLeigh Petty, Bureaucratic Ethics: IRBs and the Legal 
Regulation of Human Subjects Research, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 601, 606 (2010) (citing 
45 CFR 46.102). 
126. Id. at 602. 
 127. See generally supra Part III.A. Investigating IRB membership at eight of the top 
twenty universities ranked by U.S. News and World Report’s Top Universities of 2017 
indicated that, among the 169 of 173 members (including alternates) for whom information 
was available, 12 (7%) held JD degrees; for the ten of these twelve for whom information 
was available, none practiced criminal law or, more specifically, criminal defense. 
128. See Heimer & Petty, supra note 125, at 614–15. 
129. See supra notes 4–8, 27–45 and accompanying text. 
130. The Authors are grateful to Meg Ledyard for raising this point. 
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defendant-defender relationships—whether or not those researchers do 
so as members of the defense team. Space limitations also prevent full 
discussion of important questions regarding whether and how researcher 
participation alters the very communication that are under review. 
Instead, this Article aims to build on prior arguments for developing an 
evidentiary privilege for researchers. More specifically, we explore how 
research ethics can work in tandem with that evidentiary privilege to 
encourage research on communication in the public defense context. 
B.   Research Ethics and the Evidentiary Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege does not protect communications 
involving a third party; such communications are not deemed 
“confidential.”131 Moreover, at common law there was no researcher’s 
privilege.132 Thus, at the time of Neustadter’s study, he was right to warn 
participating lawyers and clients that he and they might face a choice 
between jail for contempt of court or the forced disclosure of 
communications that would have been protected if Neustadter had not 
been present to observe them.133 
Today, however, enforcement of a researcher’s privilege is not a novel 
idea. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pioneered 
the practice years ago in an antitrust case134 and applied it more recently 
in criminal proceedings.135 Congress and the Supreme Court anticipated 
such judicial development of privilege doctrine “in the light of reason and 
experience” when they respectively drafted and approved Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501.136 Nevertheless, the researcher’s privilege, like all 
privileges, is not absolute; despite criticism from some commentators, 
disclosure of privileged information is subject to case-by-case, item-by-
item balancing tests.137 
 131. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. In disciplines other than law, the 
term confidentiality is often used interchangeably with privacy or privilege. See, e.g., Paul 
Stiles & John Petrila, Research and Confidentiality Legal Issues and Risk Management 
Strategies, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 333 (2011).  
132. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (describing common law privileges). 
 133. Neustadter, supra note 57, at 280–83; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 
397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) (enforcing contempt order against researcher; rejecting First 
Amendment privilege to withhold information obtained from confidential sources in course 
of sociological research). 
134. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714–15 (1st Cir. 1998).  
135. United Kingdom v. Trustees of Boston College, 718 F.3d 13, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2013). 
136. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
137. Robert H. McLaughlin, From the Field to the Courthouse: Should Social Science 
Research Be Privileged?, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 927, 932 (1999); John Lowman & Ted 
Palys, Protecting Research Confidentiality: Towards a Research-Participant Shield Law, 
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Thus, the current state of the law makes it is impossible to guarantee 
to research subjects that their words will be shielded from forced 
disclosure. The discussion below offers a belt-and-suspenders approach 
to reducing that risk in the context of research on attorney-client 
communication in public defense. The belt comprises protections 
mandated by federally regulated research ethics. The suspenders are the 
nascent, evolving researcher’s privilege. 
We offer this approach because the risk of forced disclosure of 
researcher-observed communication has chilled the pursuit of knowledge 
on a critically important topic.  The harm is significant, documented, and 
increasing, particularly in an era when empirical research is often 
acknowledged as a foundation for positive systemic change.138 We argue 
that the importance of pursuing data-informed improvement of attorney-
client communication in public defense, and the lack of alternatives to 
achieve the same results by other means, warrant robust judicial 
enforcement of privilege protections for scholars who investigate this 
topic. 
We emphasize judicial enforcement of an evidentiary privilege for 
research while recognizing and applauding arguments that favor 
statutory reform.139 We do so because courts bear ultimate responsibility 
for the quality of public defense representation,140 and therefore have a 
strong stake in the production of empirical research that can aid them in 
that task. Absent judicial enforcement of a privilege for this research, 
data necessary to improve communication in public defense are likely to 
remain largely inaccessible. The next subsection offers additional 
evidence that an evidentiary privilege is needed by explaining the 
strengths and weaknesses of protections that are mandated by research 
ethics. We argue that courts should weigh all of these factors heavily in 
favor of protecting and promoting public defense research through 
enforcement of the researcher’s privilege. 
21 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 163, 165–66 (2000); Katherine Adams, The Tension Between Researcher 
Ethics and Legal Ethics: Using Journalist’s Privilege State Statutes as a Model for a 
Proposed Researcher’s for Privilege, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 347 (2015) (quoting 
scholar Jeffrey Nestler in stating that Wigmore factors “have been superseded by a more 
expansive vision of evidentiary privileges” and arguing that privileges should be analyzed 
in a more modern way). 
138. See, e.g. Danet et al., supra note 89; Adams, supra note 137. 
139. See Lowman & Palys, supra note 137. 
140. See Beale & Myers, supra note 33, at 8–9. 
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1. Researcher-Driven Protections of Confidential
Information
Even as we call upon courts to privilege public defense research, we 
acknowledge that researchers themselves create layers of protection to 
shield confidential information from disclosure; after all, confidentiality 
is firmly “embedded as an ethical principle in codes of research ethics.”141 
Researchers must anonymize data and build firewalled, secure systems 
for collecting, maintaining, and reporting data. They must do so to 
prevent the release of personally identifying information, that is, 
information with which the public could connect research data to the 
people who provided it when they participated as subjects in the study.142 
These protections can be further strengthened  in some circumstances by 
obtaining federally sanctioned certificates of confidentiality that prevent 
compelled disclosure of identifying information “in any Federal, State, or 
local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding[s].”143 
Despite these multiple layers of protection, researchers who seek to 
investigate defendant-defender communication could augment them by 
following Cunningham and McElhinny.  Those researchers embedded 
themselves as members of the defense team, serving as attorney 
consultants and agents who were specifically tasked with improving 
communication and who therefore shared the full protections of attorney-
client privilege.144 Unfortunately, this approach has significant 
drawbacks. Benefits from the knowledge generated would accrue to 
particular legal teams and defender agencies; however, broader 
dissemination of that knowledge to improve communication practices in 
other locations, and opportunities to refine the work through additional 
research, would be sacrificed. 
Another way to reduce the risk that public defense research will result 
in forced disclosure of protected defendant-defender communication may 
be to focus research on the lower-level cases that are swamping criminal 
141. Stiles & Petrila, supra note 131, at 335; McLaughlin, supra note 137, at 960–62. 
142. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.  
143. 42 U.S.C. § 241(d)(1)(D) (2018). While these certificates may not offer absolute 
protection, they can weigh into the analysis of a case-by-case privilege for the researcher. 
Leslie E. Wolf et al., Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting the Human Subject Research 
Data in Law and Practice, 43 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 594 (2015).  
 144. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Spencer Rand, Hearing Stories 
Already Told: Successfully Incorporating Third Party Professionals Into the Attorney-Client 
Relationship, 80 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2012) (where third party professionals are acknowledged 
as essential to the representation, their inclusion in the communications does not vitiate 
attorney-client privilege). 
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legal systems.145 Improving representation at this case level is a high 
priority.146 Moreover, given the astonishingly high case numbers, plea 
rates, and processing speed—and the correspondingly limited amount of 
defendant-defender communication occurring in these cases—there may 
be a lower risk of harm from forced disclosure of protected content. At the 
same time, such research could illuminate strategies for making the most 
of limited resources while also offering new data to support caseload 
reduction or other reforms. 
Yet another approach for shielding defendant-defender 
communication from forced disclosure is to obtain a written agreement 
with the prosecution that waives access to information that researchers 
collect. Although there is one example of such an agreement from the 
1970s, the circumstances appear idiosyncratic and the breadth and 
enforceability of such a contractual obligation is unclear.147 Nor does 
there appear to be evidence that many researchers have followed 
Rosenthal’s recommendation that researchers obtain an ex ante court 
order, in cooperation with local legal luminaries, such as a bar official or 
law dean, that would “permit social science access, under appropriately 
controlled circumstances, to attorney-client consultations without 
thereby waiving the privilege against revealing what was said in a legal 
proceeding.”148 
2. Evidentiary Protections
Ultimately, concerns about the adequacy of researcher-driven 
protections to prevent forced disclosure of defendant-defender 
communication underscore the need for a robust researcher’s privilege. 
As a general matter, the classical recipe for successful invocation of an 
evidentiary privilege requires that (1) communications are coupled with 
 145. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 279–81 (2011); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320–21 (2012). 
146. Roberts, supra note 145, at 281–90. 
 147. SHOOTING OF BIG MAN: ANATOMY OF A CRIMINAL CASE, HBO (1979), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSHXZ-tCXBg [https://perma.cc/J4WZ-9P5R]. The 
film-maker sought and obtained permission of the Seattle King County Public Defender 
Office to film the murder case of Jack Jones from arraignment through verdict. They filmed 
lawyer-client communications in the jail and in the courtroom as well as other significant 
parts case preparation and trial. Defense lawyers obtained oral consent from the 
prosecutors not to seek the footage of lawyer-client communications or to subpoena the 
filmmakers. Interview with Eric Salzman, filmmaker, and Mark Leemon, former felony 
supervisor at the King County Public Defender. 
148. See Douglas E. Rosenthal, Comment On “Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client 
Interaction: The Biography of a Failure,” 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 923, 928 (1980). 
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reliance that they will remain confidential; (2) confidentiality is essential 
to maintaining the relationship in question; (3) the public has an interest 
in fostering that relationship; and (4) the harm from disclosure outweighs 
the benefit (defined as a contribution that helps to ensure the correct 
resolution of the case).149 However, as scholars have noted, over the past 
century these factors “have been superseded by a more expansive vision” 
that accommodates contemporary realities.150 Those contemporary 
realities include the growing importance of empirical research to the 
public. 
Thus, in Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp.,151 an antitrust action, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced a 
researcher’s privilege.152  In Cusumano, Microsoft subpoenaed researcher 
notes, transcripts of conversations, and other materials used in a book 
about corporate competition to market Web browsers. Microsoft claimed 
that conversations between the author and officials from other companies 
would aid its defense.153 The panel turned to the journalist’s privilege as 
an apt analogy and concluded that 
courts ought to offer similar protection to academicians engaged in 
scholarly research. After all, scholars too are information gatherers 
and disseminators. If their research materials were freely subject to 
subpoena, their sources likely would refuse to confide in them. As with 
reporters, a drying-up of sources would sharply curtail the information 
available to academic researchers and thus would restrict their output. 
Just as a journalist, stripped of sources, would write fewer, less 
incisive articles, an academician, stripped of sources, would be able to 
provide fewer, less cogent analyses. Such similarities of concern and 
function militate in favor of a similar level of protection for journalists 
and academic researchers.154 
After acknowledging the importance of knowledge production, the 
panel balanced the necessity and materiality of the information sought 
against the harm of production and quashed the subpoena.  The panel 
reasoned that Microsoft had substantial interests at stake but could 
obtain the information elsewhere, whereas compelled disclosure of the 
confidential information would chill the use of interviews to research 
149. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
 150. Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court 
Recognition of a Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 201, 213 (2005). 
151. 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998). 
152. Id. at 711. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 714. The roles of the First Amendment and academic freedom in protecting 
the free flow of information for academic scholarship are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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business management practices.155 Similar reasoning has led to similar 
results in other cases. For example, one court applied Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 26 and 45 to quash a drug company’s subpoena for peer 
review comments on articles that had been submitted for publication, but 
were rejected by the New England Journal of Medicine.156  The court 
reasoned that the company’s own experts could review the state of 
scientific knowledge on the safety of its products and that disclosure 
would irrevocably compromise the peer review process.157 
The First Circuit applied the same balancing test in a criminal case, 
partly enforcing and partly rejecting a research privilege in United 
Kingdom v. Trustees of Boston College.158 In that case, the U.S. 
government acted on British authorities’ invocation of treaty rights by 
seeking information from a research project on former members of the 
Irish Republican Army who were suspects in a kidnapping and 
murder.159 Despite the researchers’ belt-and-suspenders attempts to 
protect the information—including non-disclosure agreements with the 
interview subjects—the court required disclosure of a subset of materials 
deemed relevant to the investigation.160 The court expressly rejected a 
request to provide “special protection, in the form of ‘heightened 
sensitivity’” to the academic research materials at issue, reasoning that 
“the strength of the governmental and public interest in not impeding 
criminal investigations,” particularly in a case involving an international 
treaty, warranted review under an “ordinary relevance” test.161 
However, the First Circuit also emphasized that, despite the strong 
interest in not impeding criminal investigations, analysis of the 
researcher’s privilege is a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry.162 Thus, the 
specific significance of research to advancing scientific inquiry is a key 
criterion for enforcing the privilege. As one scholar put it, the issue “is 
not . . . a simple question of disclosure or nondisclosure, but rather one 
aspect of the highly nuanced field of what sorts of truth are most valuable 
155. Id. at 716–17. 
 156. In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 8, 
13-15 (D. Mass. 2008). 
157. Id.; see also In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1530–31 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(issuing protective order for medical research); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1276 
(7th Cir. 1982) (quashing subpoena of research on herbicides).  
158. 718 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2013). 
159. Id. at 16–17. 
160. Id. at 34. 
161. Id. at 20, 23–25. 
162. Id. at 23–25. 
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in the context of specific events occurring in particular social spaces and 
at certain moments in time.”163 
There are a number of compelling interests weighing in favor of robust 
protection for research on attorney-client communication in the public 
defense setting. The efficacy and legitimacy of U.S. criminal legal 
systems are highly contested,164 and public defense plays a crucial role in 
that contest.165 Courts have acknowledged the critical role of attorney-
client communication to effective representation166 and have the ultimate 
duty of enforcing the right to counsel.167 Thus, courts occupy a distinctive 
“social space and . . . moment[] in time”168 that should encourage their 
enforcement of a privilege protecting empirical research on 
communication between government-paid criminal defense lawyers and 
the people who need them. Indeed, a contrary result would leave U.S. 
courts and researchers increasingly isolated on the national stage.169 
V.  CONCLUSION 
An early advocate of empirical research on attorney-client relations 
noted that they are a unique site of “conflict between democratic control 
by lay citizens and authoritative policy direction by specialists” that raise 
“a classical problem of politics, and perhaps, in a democratic society, the 
classical problem.”170 Twenty years later, another leading researcher in 
the field insisted that “there are sound theoretical reasons to believe that 
lawyer neglect of clients is a serious social problem” requiring reform 
efforts grounded in empirical investigation.171 These observations are all 
the more salient today in the public defense context, given the 
fundamental nature of the right at issue, the critical role of courts in 
enforcing that right, the size and complexity of the barriers to quality 
communication in public defense, and the dearth of evidence-informed 
strategies for systemic improvement. By highlighting these problems and 
opportunities, this Article aims to spark scholarly engagement with 
empirical investigations into the quality of attorney-client 
163. McLaughlin, supra note 137, at 932.  
164. See Moore, supra note 33, at 176–79. 
165. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
167. See Beale & Myers, supra note 33, at 8–9. 
168. See McLaughlin, supra note 137. 
169. Frank Murray, Boston College’s Defense of the Belfast Project: A Renewed Call for 
a Researcher’s Privilege to Protect Academia, 39 J. COLLEGE & UNIV. L. 659, 661, 680–88 
(2013).  
170. ROSENTHAL, supra note 89, at 4.  
171. Felstiner, supra note 26, at 124, 144. 
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communication in public defense, to focus attention to the ethical and 
legal issues implicated by such research, and to heighten judicial interest 
in protecting and promoting that work through robust enforcement of an 
evidentiary privilege for researchers who heed the call. 
